concludes." 4 Because civil wars are so peculiarly agonizing and leave such deep scars on historical memory, they appear to be almost as hard to end as they are awful to endure. "If war is hell," the historian Arno Mayer proposed in 2000, with a nod to William Tecumseh Sherman, "then civil war belongs to hell's deepest and most infernal regions." 5 Ending civil war is the starting point for each of the essays in this timely AHR Roundtable, published to coincide with the sesquicentennial of the formal conclusion of the U.S. Civil War in 1865. They span the whole history of civil war, from ancient Rome to the present, and over every inhabited continent, from the Americas and Africa to Europe and Asia. They examine the varied conditions and methods for concluding civil wars, from military victory and constitutional settlement to amnesties, peace agreements, and international treaties. They also movingly describe the anguished aftermaths of civil war: among them, burying the dead, physical reconstruction, the dislocation of refugees, and the traumas of memory. Each engages with the rich historiography on specific civil wars and many draw upon the work of contemporary political scientists who have analyzed civil war termination synoptically and synthetically. 6 Taken together, they constitute the most extensive comparative treatment of civil war-and not just of ending civil war-ever assembled. 7 4 Quoted in Gregorio Marañon Moya, "El general De Gaulle, en Toledo," El País, August 8, 1981, 8 : "Todas las guerras son malas, porque simbolizan el fracaso de toda política. Pero las guerras civiles, en las que en ambas trincheras hay hermanos, son imperdonables, porque la paz no nace cuando la guerra termina. Spain, Yugoslavia, and Greece, 1936 -1949 (New York, 2006 ; Stanley G. Payne, Civil War in Europe, 1905 -1949 (Cambridge, 2011 along with a fourth that never was, the Glorious Revolution of 1688-1689. 26 The Taiping War lasted thirteen years (1851-1864) and was the nineteenth century's bloodiest. The U.S. Civil War carried on formally for only four years (1861-1865), but by some accounts was not concluded until five years beyond Appomattox in 1870, as Republicans declared that "wartime continued" through Reconstruction,
anticipating the increasing elasticity of "wartime" more generally in the twentieth century. 27 The civil war in El Salvador went on for twelve years, while present--day Afghanistan threatens to suffer fresh "conflict that is curiously similar to the pre--Coalition civil war" when (or if) the U.S.--led forces in the country finally depart.
These experiences of long duration, difficult termination, and bitterly contested memory could have been illustrated equally well by other drawn--out civil wars, in Guatemala (1960 Guatemala ( -1996 , Lebanon (1975 -1990 ), and Sri Lanka (1983 -2009 ), for instance. 28 Social scientists who study civil wars have queried whether they are objectively harsher, more destructive, or more lacking in logic than other kinds of conflict. 29 In the process, they have confirmed that civil wars seem particularly wars. It now appears that "the most likely legacy of a civil war is further civil war." 30 In our own century, most of these apparently "neverending wars" have been resumptions of earlier civil wars. 31 These recent discoveries about civil war recurrence are re--discoveries of what observers have known for centuries, even millennia, about civil war: its endlessness and its endurance. The Romans had learned that civil wars were like volcanoes: both destructive and dormant, shatteringly violent and yet disturbing when quiescent because they were likely to erupt again at any time. 32 To stir the suppressed memory of civil war was, in the chilling words of the poet Horace, to "tread on fire / smouldering under ashes." 33 Pace the orator and historian Titus Labienus, forgetting (oblivio) was not the best defense against civil war, although, as Osgood remarks, half--forgetting it may have been. 34 That was hardly an option for Rome's heirs in the Latin West and beyond.
Until well into the nineteenth century, Roman conceptions shaped perceptions of civil war in the Western world and its imperial offshoots, though they were overlaid with multiple historical memories and intersected with other conceptions of internal conflict in Arabic, Asian, and other traditions. 35 Roman accounts of serial others-gave evidence that the remedies for civil war could be double--edged in their effects. The imposition, or re--imposition, of monarchy might in some circumstances be a cure, but struggles over the succession could equally likely engulf "the world in blood and ashes," as the anti--monarchical republican Thomas
Paine charged in 1776. 36 History supplied cumulative repertoires for their conclusion as well as warnings about their potential interminability, but ultimately every civil war thus had to find its own ending. How civil wars end is intimately linked to how they begin and the conditions under which they are fought. As Ussama Makdisi shows, the 1860 civil war in the empire paralleled near--contemporaneous events in the United States in presenting in each case the "quintessentially nineteenth--century problem of shifting from a system of overt discrimination to one that emphasized non--discrimination and notionally equal citizenship". Americans remained unresolved for almost a century. 40 This was hardly what the reformist French politician Agénor de Gasparin envisaged in 1865 to be "the liberal conclusion of a civil war." 41 Concluding civil wars became paradoxically more complex and more likely over the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries as they came increasingly to be matters of international concern. From the time of the Roman civil wars until the second half of the eighteenth century, such conflicts remained mostly internal or domestic matters. The American and French revolutions and the movements for redistributing sovereignty and authority in early--nineteenth--century southern
Europe and Spanish America brought questions of international recognition and intervention to the forefront of political and legal calculations for the first time. 42 In the following two centuries, during the Spanish Civil War and especially in the Cold Salvador," but it did help to end the war decisively. 43 The likelihood of civil wars being terminated by international agreements will surely only increase, even as the dangers of what Reno calls "direct partisan intervention" in civil wars have also grown. 44 Sometimes generations must pass before the fires of civil war can be extinguished. As Neufeld notes in the conclusion to his essay, "in the case of seventeenth--century England, it took fifty years, three legislative settlements, one revolution, and one foreign war to achieve civil peace once and for all." 45 Even that chastening summation may overlook the aftershocks of the British-rather than just
English-civil wars, in Scotland (where the Jacobite threat lingered until 1745, if not longer) and especially in Ireland, where, as Lord Macaulay wrote in the 1840s, the historian's "steps-to borrow a fine image used on a similar occasion by a Roman poet-are on the thin crust of ashes beneath which the lava is still glowing." 46 Similarly, the historical memory of the Taiping 
